PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY / SOVEREIGN AGENT LAB
● SPECIFICATION LIVE CASE 02 · BUILD NEXT
LIVE CASE 02 // PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY & DEFERRED CONTROLSPENDING ≠ PASS PROVISIONAL ⇒ CAP + TTLA PROVISIONAL PASS IS A FIRST-CLASS DECISION AUTHORITY IS MONOTONIC DOWNWARD UNDER PENDINGAI OVERRIDE FALSE · ALWAYS PACKET N LINKS TO N−1RULE CHANGES ARE EVENTS, NOT EDITS LIVE CASE 02 // PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY & DEFERRED CONTROLSPENDING ≠ PASS PROVISIONAL ⇒ CAP + TTLA PROVISIONAL PASS IS A FIRST-CLASS DECISION AUTHORITY IS MONOTONIC DOWNWARD UNDER PENDINGAI OVERRIDE FALSE · ALWAYS PACKET N LINKS TO N−1RULE CHANGES ARE EVENTS, NOT EDITS
LIVE CASE 02 // SPECIFICATION · BUILD NEXT // SEPTEMBER 2026

AUTHORITY CAN BE PROVISIONAL. BOUNDED. REVOCABLE.

Runtime is not a synonym for real-time. A regulated decision can be allowed now, within an explicit cap and clock, while slower controls continue — then confirmed, watched, restricted or revoked when new evidence arrives.

STATUS SPEC · BUILD NEXT LC02 ⇒ AFTER LC01 AI OVERRIDE = FALSE CAP + TTL MONOTONIC NARROWING PENDING ≠ PASS REPO LC01 ↗
STATE CONSOLE · LIVE CASE 02 SPEC · PROPOSED

A PROVISIONAL PASS IS A
FIRST-CLASS DECISION,
NOT A MISSING CHECK.

Live Case 01 asked whether evidence can earn authority. Live Case 02 asks whether authority can be explicitly bounded, time-limited and later changed when deferred controls resolve.

PENDING_T0
FAST CONTROLS RUNNING
PROVISIONAL
ALLOW_LIMITED
WATCH
LIMITED + REVIEW
RESTRICTED
ESCALATE
CONFIRMED
ALLOW
BLOCKED_T0
HARD RED
00

Two clocks, one case

FAST ACTION · SLOW ASSURANCE

The scalable pattern is not “run every expensive check before every action”. It is to separate blocking controls from deferred work and make the temporary authority explicit.

T0

Blocking checks

Cheap / essential controls finish first. A hard red can stop the case immediately.

T0+

Provisional authority

Blocking pass + deferrable pending → limited authority with cap + TTL.

T+X

Deferred evidence

EDD, external vendors, human review and other slow controls continue asynchronously.

Δ

State transition

New evidence moves the case to CONFIRMED, WATCH or RESTRICTED. Silence cannot extend provisional status forever.

01

A decision is a trajectory

STATE MACHINE

The system does not store one boolean “approved”. It stores the current state, the reason for it, the clock, the limits and the event that caused each transition.

S0
PENDING_T0
fast blocking controls still running
S1
BLOCKED_T0
hard red at admission
S2
PROVISIONAL
limited authority, deferred open
S3
CONFIRMED
required controls complete
S4
WATCH
yellow; continue under limits
S5
RESTRICTED
new evidence narrows / revokes
S6
CLOSED
lifecycle complete, packet recorded
TRANSITIONS · sdp-state-machine-v1
PENDING_T0
 ├── hard red ─────────────────────────→ BLOCKED_T0
 │
 └── blocking controls complete
     + hard red absent
     + deferred control pending
     ↓
 PROVISIONAL
 ├── deferred clear ─────→ CONFIRMED
 ├── yellow/ambiguity ───→ WATCH
 ├── late fail/red ──────→ RESTRICTED
 └── TTL expires ────────→ WATCH / RESTRICTED

WATCH
 ├── concern resolved ─────────────────→ CONFIRMED
 └── fail / timeout ───────────────────→ RESTRICTED
02

Control taxonomy — pending is not pass

ROLES, NOT VIBES

Controls need explicit roles. A missing result must never be silently interpreted as a successful check.

▚ BLOCKING

Must finish before authority.

Example: a hard-list hit or other admission condition the institution refuses to defer.

▚ DEFERRED

May finish after bounded admission.

Allowed only when the policy explicitly specifies the pending control, cap, TTL and review behavior.

▚ ADVISORY

Informative, not automatically blocking.

Signals that can influence monitoring or review without silently acquiring veto power.

03

Facts + FOL — make assumptions explicit

PROLOG SHAPE · NOT LAW

FOL does not decide what the law “really means”. It reasons over a versioned institutional assumption set selected by the institution.

CASE FACTS · case_001
case(case_001).
policy_version(case_001, policy_2026_09_v1).
assumption_set(case_001, assumptions_2026_09_v1).

control_type(sanctions, blocking).
control_status(case_001, sanctions, pass).
control_type(document_integrity, blocking).
control_status(case_001, document_integrity, pass).
control_type(source_of_funds, deferred).
control_status(case_001, source_of_funds, pending).

blocking_controls_complete(case_001).
hard_red_absent(case_001).
admission_risk_within_threshold(case_001).
deferred_control_pending(case_001).

provisional_cap(case_001, amount_gbp, 500).
provisional_cap(case_001, transaction_count, 3).
provisional_ttl_hours(case_001, 24).
ai_authorised_to_override(case_001, false).
DECISION RULES
decision(Case, provisional_allow) :-
  blocking_controls_complete(Case), hard_red_absent(Case),
  admission_risk_within_threshold(Case), deferred_control_pending(Case).

decision(Case, confirm) :-
  all_required_controls_complete(Case), hard_red_absent(Case), no_open_yellow(Case).

decision(Case, watch) :-
  control_status(Case, _, yellow), hard_red_absent(Case).

decision(Case, restrict) :-
  control_status(Case, _, fail).

decision(Case, review_required) :-
  current_state(Case, provisional), provisional_expired(Case),
  deferred_control_pending(Case).
04

Versioned assumptions — interpretation becomes inspectable policy

PROVENANCE > NUMBERS

The scarce object is not a model score. It is the documented choice: what may be deferred, for how long, under which limits, and what happens when the clock expires. Each choice records where it came from — an external instrument the institution is bound by, or an internal discretion it has taken and can be asked to defend.

ASSUMPTIONS_2026_09_V1 · YAML
assumption_set:
  id: ASSUMPTIONS_2026_09_V1
  supersedes: ASSUMPTIONS_2026_06_V2
  approved_by: <named officer>
  approved_at: 2026-09-01
  sanctions:
    may_be_deferred: false
    provenance:
      basis: external   # bound by an instrument, not chosen
      source: "<instrument reference>"
  source_of_funds:
    may_be_deferred: true
    maximum_delay_hours: 24
    provenance:
      basis: internal   # discretion taken, defensible on request
      source: "risk appetite, approved 2026-09-01"
  provisional_admission:
    maximum_amount_gbp: 500
    maximum_transactions: 3
    aggregate_exposure_gbp: 500   # per counterparty, across concurrent cases
    provenance:
      basis: internal
  recurring_review:
    enabled: true
    interval_hours: 168
    provenance:
      basis: internal
  unresolved_yellow:
    action: WATCH
  expired_deferred_control:
    action: ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN

THIS IS NOT A CLAIM THAT A LAW REQUIRES THESE VALUES — IT IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW AN INSTITUTION COULD ENCODE AND VERSION ITS OWN OPERATING INTERPRETATION. THE PROVENANCE FIELD MATTERS MORE THAN THE NUMBERS: “WE DEFER THIS BECAUSE THE INSTRUMENT PERMITS IT” AND “WE DEFER THIS BECAUSE WE DECIDED TO” ARE DIFFERENT POSITIONS TO DEFEND, AND A SUPERVISOR WILL ASK WHICH ONE APPLIES. A SET WITH NO EXTERNAL BASIS ANYWHERE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY WRONG — IT IS SIMPLY ENTIRELY THE INSTITUTION'S OWN RISK APPETITE, AND SHOULD BE LEGIBLE AS SUCH.

05

What may happen now?

FOL DERIVES · POLICY BOUNDS

FOL derives the formal state. Policy-as-code turns that state into a bounded operational action.

PROVISIONAL
{
  "action": "ALLOW_LIMITED",
  "cap_gbp": 500,
  "ttl_hours": 24,
  "pending": ["source_of_funds"],
  "ai_override": false
}
CONFIRMED
{
  "action": "ALLOW",
  "limits": null,
  "ai_override": false
}
WATCH
{
  "action": "ALLOW_LIMITED",
  "review_required": true,
  "cap_gbp": 250,
  "ai_override": false
}
RESTRICTED
{
  "action": "RESTRICT",
  "escalate_to_human": true,
  "ai_override": false
}
06

Evidence packets — a lifecycle, not one report

APPEND-ONLY IN SPIRIT

Each meaningful transition creates a new packet linked to the previous one. The evidence record becomes append-only in spirit, rather than a single mutable approval flag.

PACKET 001

T0 decision

Blocking controls, assumption set, pending controls, cap and TTL.

PACKET 002

Provisional state

Operational authority granted within explicit limits.

PACKET 003

Counterparty notice

The only outward-facing packet. States that authority is provisional, under which limits, and when a closing determination is due.

PACKET 004

Deferred result

New evidence + previous state + transition trigger.

PACKET 005

Closing state

Final controls, final action and hash of the previous packet.

PACKET 006

Policy revision

Emitted only when a case outcome changes the rule. Links the incident to the assumption set it superseded.

PACKET 003 EXISTS BECAUSE A PROVISIONAL PASS THAT THE COUNTERPARTY IS NOT TOLD ABOUT IS NOT PROVISIONAL — IT IS AN UNDISCLOSED RESTRICTION. EVERYTHING ELSE IN THE CHAIN LOOKS INWARD, AT AUDIT AND SUPERVISION. THIS ONE LOOKS OUTWARD.

TRANSITION PACKET · sdp-transition-packet-v1
{
  "schema": "sdp-transition-packet-v1",
  "case_id": "case_001",
  "sequence": 3,
  "previous_packet_sha256": "...",
  "previous_state": "PROVISIONAL",
  "new_state": "CONFIRMED",
  "trigger": { "type": "CONTROL_RESULT", "control": "source_of_funds", "result": "PASS" },
  "policy_version": "policy_2026_09_v1",
  "assumption_set": "assumptions_2026_09_v1",
  "formal_decision": "confirm",
  "institutional_action": "ALLOW",
  "ai_authorised_to_override": false
}
07

After the error — a control plane that cannot learn is not a control plane

REVISION AS MECHANISM

Nobody is asked for a system that never fails. A long run with no internal error reports is itself a finding. What is asked for is that failure has a defined path back into the rules.

01

Know the general rules

The obligations that apply, separated from the reading you have chosen.

02

State your own risk

Given this product and counterparty base: which risks you accept, which you refuse.

03

Encode it

That judgement as controls, limits and a versioned assumption set — not prose.

04

Report it

An auditable record per transition, with the interpretation in force at the time.

05

Say what happens when it breaks

The remediation path, and the mechanism by which an incident revises the rule. The fifth is the one most specifications omit.

POLICY REVISION · sdp-policy-revision-packet-v1
{
  "schema": "sdp-policy-revision-packet-v1",
  "sequence": 6,
  "previous_packet_sha256": "...",
  "trigger": { "type": "INCIDENT_REVIEW", "case_id": "case_001",
               "finding": "deferred control resolved FAIL after provisional exposure" },
  "assumption_set_before": "assumptions_2026_09_v1",
  "assumption_set_after": "assumptions_2026_10_v1",
  "changed": [{
    "key": "source_of_funds.maximum_delay_hours",
    "from": 24, "to": 4,
    "reason": "observed loss window exceeded appetite"
  }],
  "approved_by": "<named officer>",
  "ai_authorised_to_override": false
}

Assumption sets are never edited in place. A rule change is an event with a cause, an author and a hash — so the question “why did you allow that, and what did you change afterwards?” has an answer that can be checked rather than recalled.

08

Hard invariants — things the model cannot negotiate

THE IMPORTANT PROPERTIES BECOME TESTS, NOT PROSE
01Hard red ⇒ no ALLOW. Neither full nor provisional authority survives a blocking red.
02AI override = false. Always.
03PROVISIONAL ⇒ deferred pending. Otherwise provisional status has no basis.
04PROVISIONAL ⇒ blocking complete. Pending blocking checks cannot masquerade as absence of risk.
05PROVISIONAL ⇒ cap + TTL. Temporary authority must be bounded in both exposure and time.
06TTL expiry ⇒ state change. A pending case cannot remain silently provisional forever.
07Packet N links to N−1. Every transition preserves trace continuity.
08CONFIRMED ⇒ no required pending controls. Full authority requires closure of required controls.
09Late FAIL ⇒ no unrestricted ALLOW. New evidence can reduce authority.
10Policy + assumption versions persist. Every transition records which institutional interpretation was applied.
11Authority is monotonic downward under pending. While any required control is pending, caps may narrow but never widen.
12Aggregate exposure is bounded. Concurrent provisional cases for one counterparty cannot sum past the configured ceiling.
13Stale state cannot authorise. The hot path refuses a cached state older than its own TTL. The clock has one owner.
14Rule changes are events, not edits. An assumption set is superseded by a revision packet, never modified in place.
09

Reversibility gate — where this page ends and LC03 begins

CROSS-CASE INVARIANT
INVARIANT · BINDS LC02 ⇄ LC03

PROVISIONALITY EXISTS ONLY WHERE THE ACTION IS REVERSIBLE.

Everything on this page — cap, TTL, monotonic narrowing, deferred controls — is licensed by one fact: the actions it governs can be undone, clawed back or bounded after the fact. A payment can be recalled within the scheme's windows; a mandate can be revoked; a corridor can be narrowed to zero.

Disclosure is not reversible. Once identity data, ID documents or transaction history leave the institution, there is no cap and no TTL that can retrieve them. So for any irreversible outbound action, the provisional machinery on this page does not apply at all: the case may remain provisional internally, but the outbound packet may not.

reversible(action) ∧ bounded(cap, TTL) → provisional_allowed(action) irreversible(action) → deferred_controls(action) = ∅ · packet_out = nullTHIS IS WHY LC03'S HOLD RELEASES ZERO PII — AND WHY LC02'S MACHINERY NEVER JUSTIFIES A LEAK.
LC03 · why disclosure holds at zero ↗ R002 · the rule this gate explains ↗
10

Scaling hypothesis — reasoning on state changes, not every transaction

DESIGN HYPOTHESIS · NOT A CLAIM ABOUT ANY NAMED INSTITUTION
01
New fact / eventVendor result, EDD, reviewer action, TTL expiry
02
VerificationNormalize and validate the new evidence
03
FOL / policy recomputationDerive the new case state
04
Evidence packetRecord transition + versions + hashes
05
Cached case stateCompact state for the hot path: PROVISIONAL, cap, TTL, corridor
06
Hot transaction pathOPA decision service: is this action allowed now? yes / no / escalate

ASYNC CONTROL PLANE: EXPENSIVE REASONING WHEN FACTS CHANGE. THIS PAGE DOES NOT CLAIM THAT ANY NAMED INSTITUTION CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTS THIS ARCHITECTURE — IT IS A DESIGN HYPOTHESIS FOR HOW THE SAME AUTHORITY-SEPARATION IDEA COULD BE DECOMPOSED FOR SCALE.

11

Minimum reproducible trajectories — four paths are enough

NEXT BUILD · DELIBERATELY SMALL

The next build should stay deliberately small. Four deterministic trajectories can prove the time-bounded authority concept without pretending to be a bank.

A · PROVISIONAL → CONFIRMED
T0: BLOCKING PASS + DEFERRED PENDING → ALLOW_LIMITED · T+6H: PASS → ALLOW
B · PROVISIONAL → WATCH
T0: ALLOW_LIMITED · T+6H: YELLOW → WATCH
C · PROVISIONAL → RESTRICTED
T0: ALLOW_LIMITED · T+6H: FAIL → RESTRICT + HUMAN REVIEW
D · TTL EXPIRED
T0: ALLOW_LIMITED · T+24H: STILL PENDING → ESCALATE
12

Transfer — the same machine, with an agent as the subject

ONBOARDING → MANDATE

The state machine does not depend on the counterparty being a person. The banking case has decades of operational evidence behind it, which is why it is used to work the mechanics out. The machine-actor case is where the same mechanics have no incumbent answer.

▚ CASE → MANDATE

The subject is an agent acting for a principal, not a customer being admitted.

▚ CAP → SCOPE

Bounded exposure becomes bounded permission: which actions, which systems, which counterparties.

▚ TTL → VALIDITY WINDOW

The mandate expires on the clock rather than persisting until someone revokes it.

▚ DEFERRED → PENDING ATTESTATION

Human confirmation, an external check, or a credential status that has not yet resolved.

▚ RESTRICTED → REVOCATION

Late evidence narrows or withdraws the mandate — and the receiving side can see that it did.

▚ PACKET CHAIN → ATTRIBUTABLE TRACE

On whose authority the agent acted, under what interpretation, and what changed afterwards.

A provisional mandate is how an agent can be allowed to act before every attestation has resolved — without the receiving organisation having to take the sending organisation's word for it.STATED PLAINLY · LIVE CASE 02
13

Definition of done

WHEN LC02 BECOMES “EXECUTED”, NOT “SPECIFIED”
./run-live-case-02.sh
A · PROVISIONAL → CONFIRMED
B · PROVISIONAL → WATCH
C · PROVISIONAL → RESTRICTED
D · PROVISIONAL → TTL_EXPIRED → ESCALATE

CI ASSERTS

  • blocking controls complete before provisional authority
  • caps preserved · TTL enforced
  • late fail changes authority · AI override false
  • packet hash chain valid · policy_version preserved · assumption_set preserved
  • caps never widen while a control is pending · aggregate exposure ceiling holds across concurrent cases
  • expired cached state refuses to authorise · counterparty notice emitted on provisional grant
  • revision packet supersedes, never edits

UNTIL THOSE TRAJECTORIES EXIST AND REPRODUCE IN CI, THIS PAGE REMAINS A SPECIFICATION / BUILD-NEXT NOTE.

14

Summary — the line so far

LC01 → LC02 → LC03

LC01 · DEMONSTRATED

Evidence must earn authority. The model explains — it cannot overrule a failed deterministic control.

open LC01 ↗

LC02 · SPECIFIED

Authority can be provisional, bounded and revocable — cap + TTL + monotonic narrowing, with a receipt per transition.

you are here

LC03 · NEXT

Disclosure is irreversible — so provisional machinery stops at the boundary. HOLD = zero outbound PII.

open LC03 ↗